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CRITICAL ESSAYS
The "Political Offense Exception" Revisited:
Extradition Between the U.S. and the U.K.-
A Choice Between Friendly Cooperation
Among Allies And Sound Law and Policy
M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI*
PREFACE
The Denver Journal of International Law and Policy is to be com-
plimented for its initiative in exploring the thorny question of the "politi-
cal offense exception" to extradition, in light of the ratification of the
"Supplementary Treaty Concerning Extradition Between the Govern-
ment of the United States of America and the Government of the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, signed at London on
June 1972," of 25 June 1985 (hereinafter the Supplementary Treaty).1
The two articles by State Department Legal Adviser Abraham Sofaer and
Professor Christopher Blakesley reflect the dual scope of this Journal:
Law and Policy. Mr. Sofaer advocates a policy, which he largely shaped,
on extradition as an instrument of combating "terrorism." Professor
Blakesley describes with scholarship and insight the history, evolution,
and application of the "political offense exception." Both articles are sig-
nificant contributions to understanding respectively, the Administration's
policy and the legal jurisprudential significance of the "political offense
exception" in the law and practice of extradition. Mr. Sofaer's ardent ad-
vocacy of a certain policy is counter-balanced by Professor Blakesley's
equally convincing legal analysis. Intellectually, the articles are distin-
guishable as to the depth of their respective analyses and the breadth of
their research. More significantly however, the basic values embodied in
each article differ in many respects. The reader will no doubt readily note
these differences, but what may need further reflection are the future im-
* Professor of Law, DePaul University College of Law; Secretary-General, International
Association of Penal Law, International Institute of Higher Studies in Criminal Sciences.
1. The Supplementary Treaty was ratified by the Senate on July 17, 1986. It supple-
ments the Treaty on Extradition between the United States and the United Kingdom of
June 8, 1972, entered into force, January 21, 1977, 28 U.S.T. 227, T.I.A.S. No. 8468. See
Recent Development, Extradition: Limitation on the Political Offense Exception, 27 HARV.
INT'L L.J. 266 (1986).
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plications of the policy advocated by Sofaer and the description of the
law and jurisprudence provided by Blakesley. This article will seek to de-
velop a bridge between law and policy, in an effort to assess the implica-
tions of the Administration's policy on the law and practice of extradition
through the paradigm case of the Supplementary Treaty.
INTRODUCTION
Individual terror-violence has increased over the last two decades, as
has state-sponsored terror-violence.2 Notwithstanding the greater harm
caused by state-sponsored terror-violence, the United States and most
Western European countries have focused their attention and directed
their efforts against individual terror-violence,3 while treating the greater
depredations caused by state-committed terrorism with benign neglect."
Only one state that has supported individual terror-violence, Libya, has
been the target of United States reaction.' Understandably, governments
find it difficult to deal with state-committed and state-sponsored terror-
violence because of a variety of political and economic considerations, al-
though this difficulty is hardly justifiable on moral or ethical grounds.'
In the United States, the contemporary debate on terror-violence, re-
gardless of its source, origin, or cause, selectively centers on the Palestin-
ian-Israeli conflict, and to a lesser extent, on the conflict in Northern Ire-
land. The focus on the Middle East is due to the pressures of a strong
domestic constituency, the pro-Israel lobby, and on Northern Ireland be-
2. The number of international incidents rose from approximately 500 per year for the
period 1979 - 1983, to approximately 600 for 1984, and to nearly 800 for 1985, but is likely to
be lower in 1986. The number of casualties from 1984 was 1279 with 312 deaths to 2177 and
877 deaths in 1985, but 1986 is expected to fall between these two figures. See U.S. DEP'T OF
STATE, Pub. No. 744, TERRORISM: OVERVIEW & DEVELOPMENTS (1985). The figures reflected
are based on the Department of State's classification which is under "premeditated, politi-
cally motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by substantial groups or
clandestine state agents, usually intended to influence an audience." International terrorism
is defined by the U.S. as "terrorism [as defined above] involving citizens or territory of more
than one country." Id. See also, PUBLIC REPORT OF THE VICE PRESIDENT: TASK FORCE ON
COMBATTING TERRORISM (1986). See J. MURPHY, PUNISHING INTERNATIONAL TERRORISTS 109-
15 (1986); M. Bassiouni, International Control of Terrorism: Some Policy Proposals, 37
INT'L REV. CRIM. POL'Y 44 (1981) (U.N. Doc. ST/ESA/SER.M/37 (1985); M.C. Bassiouni, A
Prolegomenon to Terror- Violence, 12 CREIGHTON L. REV. 745 (1979). See generally, M.C.
BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM AND POLITICAL CRIMES (1975) [hereinafter BASSIOUNI,
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM]; Friedlander, The Implausible Dream: International Law, State
Violence and State Terrorism, in GOVERNMENT VIOLENCE AND REPRESSION (G. Lopez & M.
Stohl eds. 1986); R. FRIEDLANDER, TERRORISM: DOCUMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL AND LOCAL
CONTROL (Vols. I-I 1979; Vol. Il1 1981).
3. See J. MURPHY, supra note 2.
4. See Bassiouni & Beres, Panel on Terrorism, 1985 A.S.I.L. PROC.
5. See e.g., Church, Hitting the Source, Time, Apr. 26, 1986, at 16-27; Doerner, In the
Dead of the Night, Time, Apr. 26, 1986, at 28-31; Church, Forgetting Gaddafi, Time, Apr.
21, 1986, at 18-27; Thomas, Week of the Big Stick, Time, Apr. 7, 1986, at 14-15; Stengel,
Sailing in Harms Way, Time, Apr. 7, 1986, at 18-24.
6. See e.g., Church, The U.S. and Iran, Time, Nov. 17, 1986 at 12-26.
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cause an external ally, the United Kingdom, presses for U.S. cooperation
against IRA militancy. The issues in this article focus primarily on the
debate surrounding the latter conflict.
The conflict in Northern Ireland is unofficially reported as having
caused 25,000 casualties over the last four decades. Since the early 1980's,
both the U.K. and the U.S. have focused their efforts on enhancing the
extradition of accused IRA "terrorists" from the U.S. to the U.K. Since
1985, these efforts have centered on the Supplementary Treaty. As a bi-
lateral treaty, that instrument has no effect on the general law and juris-
prudence of the United States concerning the limits of the "political of-
fense exception," except insofar as relations with the U.K. are concerned.7
The Supplementary Treaty is, however, a landmark in the history of the
United States extradition law and policy for a number of reasons. The
signing of the Supplementary Treaty was to have signaled the end of the
Administration's support for years of legislative efforts to revise and up-
date U.S. extradition law, which, for all practical purposes, has remained
virtually unchanged since 1848.8 In addition, it indicated that the Admin-
istration favors the selective bilateral treaty approach exemplified by the
Supplementary Treaty.9 Such an approach relies on politically convenient
bilateral treaties with friendly states and political allies, and denies simi-
lar favored-state treatment to less friendly or inimical states. In some re-
spects, such a policy is a reminder of the time when only friendly sover-
7. The Report of the Committee on Foreign Relations, submitted with the Supplemen-
tary Treaty, states that Article 111(b) applies only to the United States. It does two things:
First, it limits the scope of Article III(a) in U.S. extradition proceedings to offenses listed in
Article I of the Supplementary Treaty. In other words, if an individual is to be extradited to
the United Kingdom for fraud, drug smuggling, or some other offense not listed in Article I,
that individual may not invoke Article 111(a) before a federal magistrate or judge. Article
III(b) also gives either party to the extradition proceeding the right to appeal a finding
under Article III(a). S. Exac. REP 17, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 5(1986).
8. Act of June 22, 1860, ch. 184, 12 Stat. 84; Act of March 3, 1869, ch. 141, 15 Stat. 337;
Act of June 19, 1876, ch. 133, 19 Stat. 59; Act of June 6, 1900, ch. 793, 31 Stat. 656; Act of
June 28, 1902, ch. 1301, 32 Stat. 419, 475; Act of March 22, 1934, ch. 73, 48 Stat. 454; Act of
June 25, 1948, ch. 645, 62 Stat. 822; Act of May 24, 1949, ch. 139, 63 Stat. 96; Act of Oct. 17,
1968, Pub. L. No. 90-578, Title III, § 301(a)(3), 82 Stat. 1115.
9. Originally the Administration's position, as reflected in the Extradition Act of 1981,
S. 1639, was to have the political offense exception removed from judicial consideration and
made discretionary with the Secretary of State. See Note, State Department Determina-
tions of Political Offenses: Death Knell for the Political Offense Exception in Extradition
Law 15 CASE W. REs. J. INT'L L. 137 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Note, State Department
Determination]. Subsequent bills referred back to the judicial determination of a political
offense. The administration's efforts with respect to those bills were aimed at limiting the
discretion of the judiciary. See generally, supra note 8. When the Administration came to
the conclusion that the individual would still have a right to claim the defense with respect
to crimes of violence if "exceptional circumstances" could be demonstrated, the Administra-
tion's focus shifted to the development of bilateral treaties. See United States and United
Kingdom Supplementary Extradition Treaty: Hearings on Treaty Doc. 99-8 Before the
Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 71(1985) [hereinafter cited as
Hearings] (statement of William J. Hughes) p. 23.
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eigns and states practiced extradition.10 Extradition was then viewed as a
process designed to benefit the mutual interests of political allies, to be
used against those individuals who affected the political order or stability
of the cooperating monarch or state. The bilateral treaty approach also
reflects a definite choice to revert back to the nineteenth-century view
that extradition is a contract between states where individuals are
deemed objects, rather than subjects, of the process."
Congress may not accept such a short-sighted policy approach and
may, instead, continue its efforts toward comprehensive reform of U.S.
extradition law. Nevertheless, the reform of national extradition legisla-
tion would not have a significant impact on national policy if the Execu-
tive pursues a different policy of negotiating bilateral agreements that
derogate from, or make major exceptions to, the provisions of national
law. If that is the case, the Senate, in the exercise of its constitutional
power of "advice and consent," would have to be the watchdog of na-
tional consistency, a role that is not well suited to the functions of that
body. Even so, however, the Senate may be understandably reluctant to
make discriminating judgments on a proposed bilateral treaty, or make
significant reservations or even deny ratification of a treaty, after a Presi-
dent had authorized its signature. The establishment and preservation of
a policy of national consistency is best entrusted to the Executive branch.
The tensions between the Executive and the Senate were all too ap-
parent in the ratification of the Supplementary Treaty, which the Senate
ratified with "amendments" in the nature of reservations, accompanied
by a "Resolution of Ratification," which was a binding source for that
treaty's interpretation in United States courts.'2 The Senate, in an un-
precedented manner, re-drafted the text of the Supplementary Treaty
signed by the U.S. and the U.K., adding new provisions, deleting existing
ones, and rewriting what remained of the original text. To a great extent,
the Senate departed from its constitutional role of advice and consent,
and virtually took over the President's prerogative to make treaties by re-
drafting a treaty that had already been signed. 3 Should that procedure
become a precedent, the powers of the Executive would be undermined,
and diplomatic relations between the U.S. and other states could be
strained if a country which signed a treaty found itself with new textual
10. See, e.g., 1 M.C. BASSiOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION IN U.S. LAW AND PRACTICE,
at 1-7(1983) [hereinafter cited as BASSIOUNI, EXTRADITION].
11. See generally A. BILLOT, TRAITE DE L'EXTRADITION (1874); J.B. MOORE, A TREATISE
ON EXTRADITION AND INTERSTATE RENDITION (1891). See also Hearings, supra note 9, at 100
n.7 (statement of Christopher Pyle).
12. 132 CONG. REC. S91119 (daily ed. July 16, 1986); 132 CONG. REC. S9251 (daily ed.
July 17, 1986).
13. Article II, §2 of the United States Constitution states: "The President...shall have
Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties..." The Sen-
ate's function of advice and consent is distinct from the President's power to negotiate, or
make, treaties. U.S Const. art.II,[2]. For a discussion of this principle see L. HENKIN, FOR-
EIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 130-36 (1972).
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language to which it had never agreed and about which it was never
presented a choice. In this case, however, the U.K. did not protest or re-
ject the ratified version of the Supplementary Treaty, but since treaties
are non-self-executing in the U.K., it must yet be embodied in national
legislation.
I. NATURE OF THE EXTRADITION PROCESS: A CONTRACT OF CONVENIENCE
BETWEEN STATES OR AN INTERNATIONAL LEGAL PROCESS?
Before going into an analysis of the Supplementary Treaty, it is first
necessary to state the premises articulated here concerning the nature of
the extradition process in order to provide a basis for some subsequent
appraisals. Extradition can be described as the legal process based on
treaty, reciprocity, comity, or national law, whereby one state delivers to
another the person charged or convicted of a criminal offense against the
laws of the requesting state, or in violation of international criminal law,
in order to be tried or punished in the requesting state for the particular
crime stated in the request. 4
Extradition is conducted by and between two or more sovereign
states in accordance with international law and the national laws of the
respective states. It is not an exclusively political process between govern-
ments designed to serve only their political interests. Some governments
and writers have, however, taken the position that extradition is predomi-
nantly a political process between states that involves their foreign rela-
tions, and that it is, therefore, in the nature of a "contract" or "compact"
between states.'5 The Supplementary Treaty reflects this orientation. The
implication of that conception is that the individual is only an "object"
and not a "subject" of this legal process.' 6 Consequently, the individual
would have no rights except those that each of the two states choose to
concede, without regard to other sources of international rights and obli-
gations, and sometimes even in derogation of rights under national laws.7
State-granted concessions to individuals will, of course, depend on the
degree of political closeness of the respective states, regardless of the
rights of the individual under national or international law. Thus, states
14. This definition is based on BASSIOUNI, EXTRADITION, supra note 10, ch. I, at 6-7.
15. See supra note 11.
16. Bassiouni, World Public Order and Extradition: A Conceptual Evaluation, in AK-
TUELLE PROBLEME DES INTERNATIONALEN STRAFRECHTS 10, 12, 13 (D. Oehler & P. -G. Potz eds.
1970).
17. For example, some cases in the United States have held that the right to claim a
violation of the rule of specialty is a state's right, and that in the absence of a protest by the
interested state, the individual does not have an independent right to protest a violation of
the rule. See United States v. Najohn, 785 F.2d 1420 (9th Cir. 1986); United States v. Jetter,
722 F.2d 371 (8th Cir. 1983); Fiocconi V. Attorney General of United States, 462 F.2d
475(2nd Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1059 (1972). These decisions rely on a strained inter-
pretation of United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407 (1886), which established the principle.
See BASSOUNI, EXTRADITION, supra note 10, ch. VII, section 6, at 6-10; Note, Toward a More
Principled Approach to the Principle of Specialty, 12 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 309 (1979).
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desiring to strengthen their respective public orders will make extradition
easiest between themselves. They will also reduce or eliminate some or all
the substantive and procedural rights of the relator, which they would
otherwise uphold with respect to states not enjoying such favored treat-
ment. 8 Individual rights would thus depend upon state interests, irre-
spective of the other values and policies that might be at stake. 9 The
better view, however, is that individuals are legal subjects entitled to as-
sert rights that inure to their benefit under international law, applicable
treaties, and national laws." This view requires that such rights be af-
forded to individuals uniformly and consistently and that they not be de-
pendent upon the tergiversations of political interests. Such a view de-
rives from the concept of extradition as a tripartite international process
involving the requesting state, the requested state and the relator, whose
interests must be taken into account.
While relations between the interested states may be predicated on
their perceived national interests, which legitimately include the preser-
vation of public order and the duty to cooperate in the prevention and
control of crime, there are nonetheless other interests that reflect certain
national and international values, which must also be secured. These in-
terests include protecting the integrity of governmental and judicial
processes, observing and strengthening of the rule of law, and adhering to
internationally recognized norms of human rights.2 The preservation of
these values requires that the relator's nationally and internationally de-
fined rights, whether substantive or procedural, may not be overridden by
state interests.
Furthermore, these values and interests must be defined with suffi-
cient specificity and applied with a high level of consistency that would
provide needed predictability in order to contribute to the preservation of
world public order.2 2 The consistent application of uniform standards of
practice between states and the relator is self-evidently a sound policy.
Such an application avoids competing claims and differing expectations
by states that are not treated similarly, which might otherwise produce
negative outcomes. Uniform and consistent practice is one of those com-
mon sense actions which is a wise policy in law and diplomatic relations.
18. See S. EXEC. REP. 17, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986); 132 CONG. REC. S9119 (daily ed.
July 16, 1986).
19. See supra note 17. Compare Bassiouni, supra note 16.
20. See BASSIOUNI, EXTRADITION, supra note 10, C. VAN DEN WIJNGAERT, THE POLITICAL
OFFENSE EXCEPTION TO EXTRADITION 48-50 (1980).
21 Bassiouni, Ideologically Motivated Offenses and the Political Offense exception in
Extradition: A proposed Juridical Standard for an Unruly Problem 19 DE PAUL L. REV.
217(1969).
22. See generally M. MCDOUGAL, H.D. LASWELL & L.C. CHEN, HUMAN RIGHTS AND
WORLD PUBLIC ORDER (1980); TOWARD WORLD ORDER AND HUMAN DIGNITY (W. Reisman & B.
Weston eds. 1976); M. MCDOUGAL & F. FELICIANO, LAW AND MINIMUM WORLD PUBLIC ORDER
(1961).
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II. THE BASES AND RATIONALE OF THE SUPPLEMENTARY TREATY
In its relations with the United Kingdom, the United States has con-
cluded a number of treaties, the first of which was the Jay Treaty of
1794.23 The Supplementary Treaty, is, however, the first time in the his-
tory of the U.S.-U.K. relations that the "political offense exception" has
been removed from a treaty. 4
The version of the Supplementary Treaty that was signed by the
U.S. and the U.K. in 1985 bears only a slight resemblance to the essen-
tially rewritten text as ratified by the Senate in 1986. The analysis that
follows is based on the Senate's ratified text, with occasional references to
the original 1985 text that was signed by the two governments. The Sup-
plementary Treaty is in the nature of an amendment to the 1972 Extradi-
tion Treaty and is meant to "form an integral part of the Extradition
Treaty. 
s5
A. Scope of the Supplementary Treaty
Article I of the Supplementary Treaty amends and limits the scope of
Article V, Paragraph (1)(c)(i) of the 1972 Extradition Treaty. It removes
certain crimes from the purview of the "political offense exception." The
new text of Article 1 states:
For the purposes of the Extradition Treaty, none of the following
shall be regarded as an offense of political character:
(a) an offense for which both Contracting Parties have the obliga-
tion pursuant to a multilateral international agreement to extradite
the person sought or to submit his case to their competent authorities
for decision as to prosecution;
(b) murder, voluntary manslaughter, and assault causing grievous
bodily harm;
(c) kidnapping, abduction, or serious unlawful detention, includ-
ing taking a hostage;
(d) an offense involving the use of a bomb, grenade, rocket, fire-
arm, letter or parcel bomb, or any incendiary device if this use endan-
gers any person;
(e) an attempt to commit any of the foregoing offenses or partici-
pation as an accomplice of a person who commits or attempts to com-
mit such an offense.
23. For a discussion of the historical background of the treaties, see BASSIOUNI, EXTRA-
DITION, supra note 10, at 1-107.
24. The Treaty of Amity, Commerce and Navigation with Great Britain (Jay's Treaty),
November 19, 1794, [1795] 8 Stat. 116, T.S. No. 105, reprinted in 1 W. MALLOY, TREATIES,
CONVENTIONS, INTERNATIONAL ACTS, PROTOCOLS, AND AGREEMENTS BETWEEN THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICAN AND OTHER POWERS 590 (1910). See also S. BEMIS, JAY'S TREATY: A
STUDY IN COMMERCE AND DIPLOMACY (2d ed. 1965). For a discussion of the treaty and its
effect of American extradition, see MOORE, supra note 11, at 90.
25. See supra note 1.
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As revised, the committee's amendment to Article I has five sub-
parts.2 6 Subpart (a) excludes offenses listed in certain multilateral con-
ventions from consideration as a political offense. These are conventions
in which two governments have agreed either to extradite or try an indi-
vidual sought for such an offense. The four conventions to which this at
present would apply are:
The Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft,
opened for signature at the Hague on 16 December 1970; The Convention
for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation,
opened for signature at Montreal on 23 September 1971; The Convention
on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Pro-
tected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents, opened for signature at New
York on 14 December 1973; and The International Convention against
the Taking of Hostages, opened for signature at New York on 18 Decem-
ber 1979.
Subpart (b) covers serious violent crimes against the person. The
term "voluntary manslaughter" is intended to cover crimes which have
been held by the U.K. courts to be manslaughter and which in many U.S.
states would amount to second degree murder.
Manslaughter under the law of many states of the United States is
an offense punishable by up to 10 years imprisonment and under the law
of the United Kingdom is punishable by a maximum of life imprison-
ment. In most states of the United States it applies primarily to such
involuntary offenses as the grossly negligent and reckless driving of an
automobile where a life is lost or such voluntary offenses as killing in the
heat of passion.
The remaining subparts of Article I are for the most part self-explan-
atory. Subpart (c) excludes any offense involving kidnapping, abduction,
or serious unlawful detention, including taking a hostage. Subpart (d) ex-
cludes any offense involving the use of a bomb, grenade, rocket, firearm,
letter bomb, parcel bomb or any type of incendiary device from the politi-
cal offense exception if that use endangers even a single person. Subpart
(e) carries the exclusion forward to attempts and to those who are accom-
plices. For example, an individual accused of helping to construct a bomb,
the use of which endangered a person, would not be able to assert the
political offense exception."
In Article III, an exception is made that allows a showing that the
extradition request is made on a discriminatory basis or for purposes of
persecuting the relator. That showing, if proven, would constitute a bar to
extradition.
The Senate's new text of Article III states:
(a) Notwithstanding any other provisions of this Supplementary
26. S. EXEC. Rzp. 17, supra note 18, at 6-9.
27. Id. at 6,7.
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Treaty, extradition shall not occur if the person sought establishes to
the satisfaction of the competent judicial authority by a preponder-
ance of the evidence that the request for extradition has in fact been
made with a view to try or punish him on account of his race, religion,
nationality, or political opinions, or that he would, if surrendered, be
prejudiced at his trial or punished, detained or restricted in his per-
sonal liberty by reason of his race, religion, nationality, or political
opinions.
(b) In the United States, the competent judicial authority shall only
consider the defense to extradition set forth in paragraph (a) for de-
fenses listed in Article I of the Supplementary Treaty. A finding
under paragraph (a) shall be immediately appealable by either party
to the United States district court, or court of appeals, as appropriate.
The appeal shall receive expedited consideration at every stage. The
time for filing a notice of appeal shall be 30 days from the date of the
filing of the decision. In all other respects the applicable provisions of
the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure or Civil Procedure, as ap-
propriate, shall govern the appeals process.2 8
In its "Section by Section Analysis," the Senate Report states:
Article III(a) provides that, notwithstanding Article I, "extradition
shall not occur if the person sought establishes to the satisfaction of
the competent judicial authority by the preponderance of the evidence
that the request for extradition has in fact been made with a view to
try or punish him on account of his race, religion, nationality, or polit-
ical opinions or that he would, if surrendered, be prejudiced at his
trial or punished, detained, or restricted in his personal liberty by rea-
son of his race, religion, nationality, or political opinions. ' 29
A number of committee members expressed unease at permitting
U.S. courts to entertain an inquiry as sensitive as that contemplated
by Article III(a). This is particularly the case given the nature of dis-
covery under U.S. law which has no counterpart in British or Euro-
pean practice. The committee wishes to caution that sensitive foreign
policy issues may be involved even at the discovery stage and that use
of protective orders may be appropriate.
Article III(b) applies only to the United States. It does two
things: First it limits the scope of Article 111(a) in the U.S. extradition
proceedings to offenses listed in Article I of the Supplementary
Treaty. In other words, if an individual is wanted for extradition to
the United Kingdom for Fraud, drug smuggling or some other offense
not listed in Article I, that individual may not invoke Article III(a)
before a Federal magistrate or judge.
Article III(b) gives either party to the extradition proceeding the
right to appeal a finding under Article Ill(a). Because an initial find-
ing may either be made by a Federal magistrate or Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure or Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, "as appro-
priate", controlling on appeal. If the appeal is from a Federal magis-
28. Id. at 16. See also 132 CONG. REC. S9119 (daily ed. July 16, 1986).
29. S. ExEc. REP. 17, supra note 18.
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trate's decision, it is to be lodged in Federal district court and the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure shall apply. If it is from a Federal
district court, the appeal, of course, is to be lodged with the appropri-
ate U.S. court of appeals and the Federal Rules of Appellate Proce-
dure are to control. This article is not intended to make the Federal
Rules generally applicable to the extradition hearing itself, but only to
the appeal of a decision under Article III(a).
In either case, a notice of appeal must be filed within 30 days
from the date the decision containing the initial finding is filed. The
appeal is to be expedited at every stage. Nothing in Article 1II(b) is to
be interpreted as permitting interlocutory appeals or otherwise upset-
ting established rules of appellate procedure. 30
B. The Purposes of the Supplementary Treaty: An Overstatement
The purposes of the Supplementary Treaty are stated in the Presi-
dent's Transmittal Letter to the Senate of July 17, 1985, in that "it repre-
sents a significant step in improving law enforcement cooperation and
combating terrorism, by excluding from the scope of the political offense
exception serious offenses typically committed by terrorists." The De-
partment of State Transmittal Letter of July 3, 1985, signed by Secretary
of State George Schultz, reiterates this theme and states that "it there-
fore represents a significant step to improve law enforcement cooperation
and counter the threat of international terrorism and other crimes of vio-
lence." To a large extent these lofty purposes are overstated, and their
factual basis is questionable. The actual purpose of the Supplementary
Treaty is to assist Great Britain in quelling Irish resistance in both its
lawful and unlawful forms, the latter constituting the resort to wanton
violence or violence directed against impermissible targets.3'
The stated purpose and unarticulated premise of the Treaty are
somewhat misleading. The United States has not had the occasion to seek
the extradition of a "terrorist" from the U.K. under the current 1972
treaty."2 Thus, there is no reason to believe that the U.S. needed the Sup-
plementary Treaty. Furthermore, there is no basis to believe that the
Supplementary Treaty will benefit the U.S. in the future, because the
U.K. law and jurisprudence as to the "political offense exception" are ad-
equate to protect the interests of the U.S., particularly with respect to
any eventual extradition case involving "international terrorists""3 in
30. Id. at 7-8.
31. Hearings, supra note 9, at 97 (statement of Christopher Pyle). See also, Nation
Mourns its Loss, Time, Sept. 10, 1979, at 30-33.
32. The issue was raised by the relator and rejected by the court in Matter of Budlong
and Kember, 1 ALL ENc. REP. 714 (1980). The same applies to the Dawes-Simon Treaty of
1932, 47 Stat. 2122, and the Webster-Ashburton Treaty of 1842, 8 Stat. 572.
33. "International Terrorism" consists of those acts of violence prohibited by multilat-
eral conventions, irrespective of whether or not the acts occur exclusively within a national
jurisdictional context. See, e.g., Friedlander, supra note 2; Bassiouni, International Terror-
ism, supra note 2.
VOL. 15:2,3
"POLITICAL OFFENSE ExCEPTION" REVISITED
which the U.S. would be the requesting state and the U.K. the requested
state.3 4 The real purpose of the Supplementary Treaty is to avoid the
U.S. application of the "political offense exception" with respect to re-
quests by the U.K. for Irish resisters who engage in acts of violence.
There have been three cases decided in the U.S. involving persons who
committed acts of violence in the U.K. and Northern Ireland, who were
sought for extradition by the U.K., and whose extradition was denied by
U.S. courts on the grounds that the "political offense exception" applied
to them: In re McMullen," In re Mackin," and Matter of Doherty.7 In
addition to these three cases, the District Court in Quinn v. Robinson
recognized the applicability of the "political offense exception,"3 " but the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed it.39 The Supple-
mentary Treaty came about because of these cases. It was due in part to
secure the return of these four individuals to the U.K. that the original
text of the 1985 Supplementary Treaty contained a retroactive applica-
tion provision and a provision removing the application of the requested
state's statute of limitation.' The Senate's ratified version precludes that
result.
The three cases that denied the U.K.'s extradition requests were de-
cided under the 1972 Extradition Treaty"' in accordance with the long-
standing jurisprudence of the U.S. on the "political offense exception' '42 .
None of these cases constitutes a departure from the jurisprudence in ex-
34. See infra note 45.
35. Magistrate's Decision No. 3-78-1099 M.G. at 3 (N.D. Cal. May 11, 1979).
36. 8 Cr. Misc. 1 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 13, 1981), alI'd, United States v. Mackin, 668 F.2d 122
(2d Cir. 1981).
37. Matter of Doherty, 599 F.Supp. 270 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). See also 85 Civ. 935-C.F.H.
(S.D.N.Y. June 25, 1985) (Government's declaratory judgment petition denied).
38. C-82-6688 R.P.A. (N.D. Cal. Oct. 8, 1983).
39. Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F.2d 776 (9th Cir. 1983).
40. See Article V of the Supplementary Treaty as ratified by the Senate, 132 CONG.
REC. S9119 (daily ed. July 16, 1986).
41. See supra notes 35-38.
42. See Ornalez v. Ruiz, 161 U.S. 502 (1896); Artukovic v. Rison, 784 F.2d 1354 (9th
Cir. 1986) (extradition granted); Eain v. Wilkes, 641 F.2d 504 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454
U.S. 894 (1981); Escobedo v. United States, 623 F.2d 1098 (5th Cir. 1980); Jhirad v. Fer-
randina, 536 F.2d 478 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 833 (1976); Shapiro v. Fer-
randina, 478 F.2d 894 (2d Cir. 1973); Garcia-Guillern v. United States, 450 F.2d 1189 (5th
Cir. 1971), cert. denied sub nom. Jimenez v. Hixon, 373 U.S. 914 (1962); Matter of Sindona,
450 F.Supp. 672 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) aff'd sub nor Sindona v. Grant, 619 F.2d 167 (2d Cir.
1980); In re Gonzalez, 217 F.Supp. 717 (S.D.N.Y. 1963); Ramos v. Diaz, 179 F.Supp. 459
(S.D. Fla. 1959); Artukovic v. Boyle, 107 F.Supp. 11 (S.D. Cal. 1952) (no extradition treaty
between U.S. and Yugoslavia), rev'd sub nom Ivancevic v. Artukovic, on remand sub nom
Artukovic v. Boyle, 140 F.Supp. 245 (S.D. Cal. 1956) (political offense exception precluded
extradition), a/f'd sub nom Karadzole v. Artukovic, 247 F.2d 198 (9th Cir. 1957), rev'd, 355
U.S. 898 (1958) (full hearing on political offense exception required), on remand sub nom
U.S. v. Artukovic, 170 F.Supp. 383 (S.D. Cal. 1959) (political offense exception precluded
extradition); In re Lincoln, 228 F. 70 (S.D.N.Y. 1915); In re Ezeta, 62 F. 972 (N.D. Cal.
1894); See also RESTATEMENT OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, § 477
comment (g), reporters' notes 4 and 5 (Tent. Draft No. 7, 1986).
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istence in the U.S." Furthermore, there has historically been no signifi-
cant difference between the decisions of the U.S. and those of the U.K. on
the interpretation and application of the "political offense exception."""
The U.S. position is predicated on the same English cases upon which the
U.K. relies." Furthermore, the jurisprudence of the U.S. courts does not
suggest that "wanton violence" would benefit from the "political offense
exception."" The conclusion is thus inescapable that the Supplementary
Treaty is intended to benefit the U.K. in its ongoing civil strife in North-
ern Ireland, regardless of the merits of the issue, the nature of the act, the
potential legitimacy of the act under existing U.S. and international legal
standards, and the fact that such preferential treatment is reserved for
the U.K. and is denied, at least at present, to all other states with which
the U.S. has extradition relations.
III. EXCLUSIONS FROM THE "POLITICAL OFFENSE EXCEPTION" IN THE
SUPPLEMENTARY TREATY
A. International Crimes and Crimes Under National Law
The purpose and policies of the "political offense exception" and the
values embodied therein should be first identified before appraising their
significance. They include inter alia: 1) political neutrality in foreign in-
ternal conflicts; 2) the individual and collective right of resistance, includ-
ing armed resistance under certain conditions and subject to certain rules;
3) the application of internationally recognized norms of human rights
with respect to the rendition of a requested person; and 4) an interna-
tional duty to cooperate in the prevention and suppression of interna-
tional criminality as a means of preserving world order."7 It is in light of
these purposes, policies and values of the "political offense exception"
that the following analysis is made with respect to the relevant provisions
of the Supplementary Treaty.
43. Id.
44. See Cantrell, The Political Offense Exception in International Extradition: A
Comparison of the United States, Great Britain and the Republic of Ireland, 60 MARQ. L.
REV. 777 (1977).
45. See Re Castioni, [1891] 7 Q.B. 149, subsequently expanded in Re Meunier [1894] 2
Q.B. 415, and in Regina v. Governor Brixton Prison ex parte Kolcynski, [1955] 1 Q.B. 540.
See also Schtracks v. Government of Israel, (1964) A.C. 556; Cheng v. Governor of
Pentonville Prison, (1973) A.C. 931; Regina v. Governor of Pentonville Prison ex parte Tzu-
Tsai, (1975) 7 W.L.R. 893. See generally V. E. HARTLEY BOOTH, BRITISH EXTRADITION LAW
AND PROCEDURE (1980); 2 J. STEPHEN, HISTORY OF CRIMINAL LAW IN ENGLAND (1883). Ste-
phen states, "fugitive criminals are not to be surrendered for extradition crimes if those
crimes were incidental to and form part of political disturbance .. " Id. at 71 (emphasis
added). See also Gilbert, Terrorism and the Political Offense Exemption Reappraised, 34
INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 695 (1985).
46. Eain v. Wilkes, 641 F.2d 504 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 894 (1981). See Ba-
noff & Pyle, To Surrender Political Offenders: The Political Offense Exception to Extradi-
tion in United States Law, 16 N.Y U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 169 (1984).
47. See Bassiouni, supra note 21.
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The exclusions contained in Article I of the Supplementary Treaty
can be divided into two categories:"international crimes" and "ordinary
crimes of violence." Paragraphs (a), (b), (c), and (d) cover "international
crimes," with respect to which a number of applicable international crim-
inal law conventions provide for the alternative duty to prosecute or ex-
tradite, aut dedere aut iudicare.4 s Thus, these provisions of the Supple-
mentary Treaty are in conformity with the international legal obligations
of the United States and the United Kingdom, to the extent that the two
countries have ratified the relevant international criminal law conven-
tions,4 and to the extent that these obligations are part of customary
international law.50 However, the exclusions in the Supplementary Treaty
are more restrictive than their counterparts in the relevant international
criminal conventions." The Supplementary Treaty unconditionally obli-
gates the parties to extradite, whereas the relevant international criminal
law conventions provide for the alternative right to prosecute.5 2 The Sup-
plementary Treaty allows for the alternative of prosecution. However,
there is no such jurisdictional basis for prosecution under existing U.S.
law unless the act charged has an impact in the U.S.;53 thus the alterna-
tive does not exist.
Paragraphs (b) through (e) of the Supplementary Treaty apply to
"ordinary crimes of violence". These exclusions are not supported by any
international duty to extradite, except for the portion of paragraph (d)
that concerns the mailing of explosive devices. All the other enumerated
offenses are ordinary crimes of violence, which, when linked to an actor's
political motives, have usually been regarded as non-extraditable under
the "political offense exception" as applied in the U.S. the U.K., and
most Western European states.54 Thus, these exclusions constitute a de-
48. See, e.g., Bassiouni, The Penal Characteristics of Conventional International
Criminal Law, 15 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 27, 35 n.31 (1983).
49. See M.C. BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL CRIMES: DIGEST/INDEX OF INTERNATIONAL IN-
STRUMENTS 1815 TO 1985 (2 vols. 1985) [hereinafter BASSIOUNI, DIGEST]. The author identi-
fies twenty-two categories of international crimes that are the subject of 312 international
instruments, a number of which contain provisions on extradition, which are listed at the
end of each of the twenty-two categories of crimes.
50. Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38. See generally A. D'AMATO,
THE CONCEPT OF CUSTOM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1968); 1 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTER-
NATIONAL LAW (1968).
51. See BASSIOUNI, DIGEST, supra note 49. Under each category of crime, references are
made in the relevant conventions to the specific treaty provisions on extradition and prose-
cution. Also at the end of each category of crime, a summary of these provisions is
contained.
52. Id.
53. See infra note 69. See also H.R. 4151, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., 132 CONG. REC. H5944
(daily ed. Aug. 12, 1986); Blakesley, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction, in 2 M.C. BASSIOUNI, IN-
TERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: PROCEDURE 3 (1986).
54. For a listing of cases from over twenty countries, see C. VAN DEN WIJNGAERT, supra
note 20. See also 2 BASSIOUNI, EXTRADITION, supra note 10, at 1-108; S. BEDI, EXTRADITION
IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1968); HARTLEY-BooTH, supra note 45; I. SHEARER, EXTRADITION IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW (1977). For earlier seminal works, see A. BiLLoT, supra note 11; E.
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parture from existing precedent in the United States and the United
Kingdom"' because they remove from the judicial and executive branches
consideration of the applicability of the "political offense exception" for
any of the acts enumerated, regardless of their insignificance, purpose,
justification, or excusability."6
Because of the differences in applicable sources of law, the two cate-
gories of Article I, paragraph (a) and that portion of paragraph (d) con-
cerning the mailing of explosive devices, are consistent with the relevant
international criminal law conventions ratified by both the U.S. and U.K.,
and embodied in U.S. law. These are the 1970 Hague Convention,5 7 the
1971 Montreal Convention on Aircraft Sabotage,58 the 1974 Convention
on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally
Protected Persons,59 and the Convention on Taking of Hostages.60
A number of international conventions prohibit the use of the mails
to send dangerous explosives.6 1 Because this is a technique used in terror-
violence, whether committed by individuals, small groups or governmen-
tal secret services, it must be included among those international crimes
that are "exceptions to the exception."" That type of conduct should
have been included in Article I, paragraph (a) rather than paragraph (h),
but the error appears to have been a technical oversight by the drafter.
It must be noted that the 1977 European Convention on the Sup-
pression of Terrorism 63 excludes from the "political offense exception"
those same "international crimes" excludable under Article I, paragraph
CLARKE, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EXTRADITION (4th ed. 1903); J.B. MOORE, supra note 11.
For a critical review of the political offense exception and some of its applications, see
Carbonneau, The Political Offense Exception To Extradition and Transnational Ter-
rorists: Old Doctrine Reformulated And New Norms Created, 1 ASILS INT'L L.J. 1 (1977);
Gilbert, supra note 45; Hannay, International Terrorism and the Political Offense Excep-
tion to Extradition, 18 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 381 (1980); Lubet & Czackes, The Role of
the American Judiciary in the Extradition of Political Terrorists, 71 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMI-
NOLOGY 193 (1980).
55. See supra notes 42, 45.
56. See generally P. ROBINSON, CRIMINAL LAW DEFENSES (1984).
57. Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft (Hague Hijacking
Convention), 26 January 1973, 974 U.N.T.S. 177, 25 U.S.T. 564, T.I.A.S. No. 7570.
58. Convention for the suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety on Civil Avia-
tion (Montreal Hijacking Convention), 26 January 1973, 974 U.N.T.S. 177, 25 U.S.T. 564,
T.I.A.S. No. 7570.
59. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally
Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents (New York Convention), 20 February 1977,
U.N. G.A. Res. 3166 (XXVIII), 28 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 30) at 146, U.N. Doc. a/9030
(1974), 28 U.S.T. 1975, T.I.A.S. No. 8532.
60. International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, G.A. Res. 34/146
(XXXIV), 34 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 46) at 245, U.N. Doc. a/34/46 (1979), entered into
force, 3 June 1983.
61. For a list of the postal conventions from 1891 to 1984, see BASSIOUNI, DIGEST, supra
note 49, at 331-401.
62. See BASSIOuNI, EXTRADITION, supra note 10, at 74-78.
63. E.T.S. No. 90 (1977).
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(a) and portions of paragraph (d) of the Supplementary Treaty.6 4 The
U.K. is a signatory to the European Convention,68 but the U.S. is not. In
order to implement the relevant treaty obligations, the U.K. passed the
Suppression of Terrorism Act of 1978. The Terrorism Act does not define
"terrorism," but it amends Section III of the Extradition Act of 1870 as
amended by the Acts of 1965 and 1967, the basic statute of the United
Kingdom applicable to extradition with non-Commonwealth countries. 6
The second category, "ordinary crimes of violence." contains exclu-
sions that are a departure from existing U.S. and U.K. law and practice
concerning the denial of extradition on "political offense exception"
grounds. Nothing precludes the U.K. from entering into a treaty with a
foreign government to change that position, but the U.K. will have to
embody the provisions of such a treaty in an act of Parliament in accor-
dance with that country's statutory enactment requirements. Since such
legislation has not yet been passed it is difficult to assess the impact of
the Supplementary Treaty or the interpretation and application of the
current U.K. extradition law and practice.
The Supplementary Treaty's provisions excluding ordinary crimes of
violence are also a departure from existing U.S. law and practice, but
since extradition treaties are deemed self-executing in the U.S., there is
no need for additional implementing legislation. While nothing pre-
cludes the U.S. from entering into a treaty that limits the rights of indi-
viduals in extradition proceedings, such limitations cannot however, be
contrary to the Constitution." Thus, it is necessary to examine whether
the Supplementary Treaty contains any provisions that may be deemed
contrary to the United States Constitution.
B. Constitutional Questions
The first question is whether the Article I exclusions can be viewed
as violating the United States Constitution. In this context, the Article I
exclusions should be examined under the two categories: "international
crimes" and "ordinary crimes of violence."
The first category of exclusions, "international crimes," is not a viola-
tion of any constitutional provision. It adds nothing to the existing inter-
64. But see HEARINGS, supra note 9, at 311-12 (statement of Charles E. Rice) (Supple-
mentary Treaty limits political offense exception to greater extent than does European Con-
vention on Terrorism).
65. As of June, 1986, seventeen States had ratified the Convention: Austria, Belgium,
Cyprus, Denmark, F.R. Germany, Iceland, Italy, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, the Nether-
lands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, and the United Kingdom.
Some States have ratified it with reservations. Several States have not yet ratified the Con-
vention: France, Greece, Ireland, and Malta. Israel, Canada and the United States, which
can accede to European Conventions, have neither signed nor acceded.
66. See HARTLEY-BOOTH, supra note 45 at 265-335.
67. See, RESTATEMENT OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, § 131
(Tent. Draft No. 6, 1985).
68. See, e.g., Caltagirone v. Grant, 629 F.2d 739 (2d Cir. 1980).
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national legal obligations of the United States under the relevant interna-
tional conventions, which the United States has ratified, on aircraft
hijacking and sabotage, the kidnaping of diplomats and internationally
protected persons, the taking of civilian hostages, and the unlawful use of
the mails for violence. These treaty obligations are also embodied in both
Title 18 of the United States Code and in the Comprehensive Crime Con-
trol Act of 1984.69 Thus, such crimes are extraditable if charged in an
extradition request by any state with which the U.S. has an extradition
treaty. Alternatively, a requesting state may in the absence of a bilateral
extradition treaty, rely upon the provisions of the applicable multilateral
conventions as the legal basis for extradition." Thus, U.S. courts could,
as they have, reject the defense of the "political offense exception" on the
grounds that the offense for which the relator is sought constitutes an
international crime.7
The 1984 Extradition Act, still pending before the House, contains
exclusions from the "political offense exception" similar to those in Arti-
cle I of the Supplementary Treaty but allows the courts to consider "ex-
ceptional circumstances,"72 under which the exception could still apply.
Proponents of the Administrations's view oppose even that limited judi-
cial inquiry.73
The second category of exclusions, "ordinary crimes of violence,"
raises constitutional questions on two grounds, although this writer be-
lieves that neither one the these grounds are sufficient to invalidate the
Supplementary Treaty. They are: equal protection under the due process
clause of the Fifth Amendment; and the supremacy of international law
under the Constitution.
1. The Equal Protection Argument
The exclusions in question are aimed solely at persons charged with
committing such "ordinary crimes of violence" under U.K. law. The same
69. 18 U.S.C. §§ 31, 32, 34-35 (destruction of aircraft); 18 U.S.C. § 12, 1116 (violence
against foreign officials); 18 U.S.C. §§ 231, 371, 1117 (conspiracy); 18 U.S.C. §§ 231-33, 921-
22 (illegal possession of firearms); 18 U.S.C. §§ 351, 1751 (kidnaping public officials); 18
U.S.C. §§ 552, 871, 877-879 (threats); 18 U.S.C. §§ 841-842 (possession of explosives); 18
U.S.C. §§ 1111-1114, 1751, 2031 (killing or assaulting federal officials); 18 U.S.C. § 1716
(mailed explosives); 18 U.S.C. §§ 2151-52 (sabotage); Omnibus Diplomatic Security and
Anti-Terrorism Act of 1986, 100 Stat. 853, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
1865; Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, P.L. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1976 (1984). See also
B.J. GEORGE, THE COMPREHENSIVE CRIME CONTROL ACT OF 1984 147-216 (1986).
70. See Derby, Duties and Powers Respecting Foreign Crimes, 30 AM. J. COMP. L. 523,
531 (Supp. 1982).
71. See Demjanjuk v. Meese, 784 F.2d 114 (D.C. Cir. 1986); Artukovic v. Rison, 784
F.2d 1354 (9th Cir. 1986).
72. Extradition Reform Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. § 3194 (e)(2) 1984. See H.R. 3347, 98th
Cong., 18 U.S.C. 2d Sess. 27-31 (1984).
73. See, e.g., The Extradition Act of 1981: Hearings on S. 1639 Before the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., Ist Sess. 3,4 (statement of Daniel McGovern).
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exclusions do not apply to persons who commit the same offenses in other
states with which the U.S. also has extradition treaties. Thus, persons
committing the same acts could benefit from the "political offense excep-
tion" depending on the country where the act is committed. In other
words, the acts of violence that are no longer part of the "political offense
exception" where the requesting state is the U.K., would still be part of
the exception where the requesting state is any of the other states with
which the U.S. has extradition relations. 4 This "double standard ' 75 may
be a violation of equal protection under the due process clause of the
Fifth Amendment. There is no valid legal basis for discriminating against
persons in the U.S., including U.S. citizens, who commit an offense in the
U.K. for which they could be extradited, but who would not be extradita-
ble if the same offense were committed in another State. A political value
judgment on the importance of relations between the United States and
the United Kingdom should not be a sufficient basis for such a distinc-
tion.76 Since that distinction, however, is made by treaty, the question
remains whether a bilateral treaty can override the Constitution. Since
the issue of unwarranted class discriminations does not seem, to this
writer's knowledge of constitutional law, to be supported by existing ju-
risprudence, the ultimate issue of an eventual conflict between the Sup-
plementary Treaty and the Constitution cannot be reached. The most ob-
vious contrary argument is that the various U.S. extradition treaties with
different countries have historically contained different extraditable of-
fenses and differing provisions on certain defenses, and the issue of ine-
quality of legal standards has never been ruled upon as being
unconstitutional.
In practice, the exclusions in question are likely to involve only U.K.
or Irish citizens engaged in armed rebellion against the U.K. Thus, they
are essentially "IRA exclusions."" This raises another issue o f unconsti-
tutional discrimination on the basis of race and political conviction. 7 An
Irish resister engaging in armed rebellion against the U.K., who is part of
an organized resistance group and whose target is legally permissible
under both existing U.S. and U.K. interpretations of the "political offense
exception" and the international regulation of armed conflicts,79 would be
74. See generally, I KAVASS & A. SPRUDZS, EXTRADITION LAWS AND TREATIES: UNITED
STATES (1980).
75. HEARINGS, supra note 9, at 73 (statement of William J. Hughes). See also Pyle,
Defining Terrorism, 62 FOREIGN POLICY 63 (1986).
76. Under traditional equal protection analysis, a classification must be at least ration-
ally related to a legitimate governmental interest. See, e.g. Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495
(1976). See also HEARINGS, supra note 9 at 73 (statement of William J. Hughes).
77. See HEARINGS, supra note 9, at 281 (statement of this author).
78. The term "race" is used here in its non-technical meaning and refers to an identifi-
able ethnic group in violation of the 1967 Protocol to the 1951 Refugee Convention, 820
U.N.T.S. 454. See The 1980 Refugee Act, 8 U.S.C. § 242(h). See also Symposium, Transna-
tional Legal Problems of Refugees, 1982 MICH Y.B. INT'L LEG. STUD. 1.
79. See infra notes 85, 86.
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extradited to the U.K. A member of another national group who commit-
ted a similar act against any other country would be protected by the
"political offense exception." Admittedly, these are novel arguments with
respect to the application of equal protection to extradition, and there is
no precedent or authority to support it.
2. The Supremacy of International Law Argument
The Constitution implies a supremacy of international law over na-
tional legislation, and presumably over bilateral treaties. Such a ranking
arises from the provisions conferring upon Congress the power "to define
and punish offenses against the Law of Nations" (Article I, § 9), and
those concerning ambassadors, treaties, war and other international acts
and relations.80 The implication is that a bilateral treaty cannot derogate
from an established rule of international law, because of its higher rank-
ing. To the best of this writer's knowledge (who admittedly is not a con-
stitutional law expert), treaties, whether bilateral or multilateral, are "the
supreme law of the land,"'" and no case known to this writer holds that a
treaty, once ratified, can be judicially tested on the basis of its lack of
conformity to other sources of international law. That does not mean,
however, that the question cannot be raised. The arguments in this in-
stance would be that the Supplementary Treaty derogates from custom-
ary international law.
At present, every legal system similar to that of the U.S., or with
equivalent concepts and practices of fairness and due process, allows the
"political offense exception" to include the offenses unconditionally ex-
cluded under the provisions of Article I, paragraphs (b) through (e).82 An
argument can thus be made that there exists a customary international
law regarding the political offense exception and that, the U.S. is subject
to it. 3 It is this writer's belief, however, that such an argument is of ques-
tionable constitutional merit.
Another related constitutional argument, is however, meritorious.
The U.S. has certain treaty obligations under the four Geneva Conven-
tions of August 12, 1949,84 and other sources of the customary rules of
80. See e.g., HENKIN, supra note 13; H. STEINER & D. VAGTS, TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL
PROBLEMS 562-652 (1986).
81. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 6.
82. See supra note 54.
83. See supra note 50.
84. The Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949: No. I For the Amelioration of the
Wounded and Sick in the Armed Forces of the Field, 6 U.S.T. 3114, T.I.A.S. No. 3362, 75
U.N.T.S. 31; No. II. For the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick and Ship-
wrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, 6 U.S.T. 3115, T.I.A.S. No. 3363, 75 U.N.T.S.
85.; No. III. Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, 6 U.S.T. 3316, T.I.A.S. No. 3364,
75 U.N.T.S. 135; No. IV. Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in War, 6 U.S.T.
3516, T.I.A.S. No. 3365, 75 U.N.T.S. 287; The Protocols Additional to the Geneva Conven-
tions of August 12, 1949, June 10, 1977, U.N.Doc. A/32/144 (1977); Hague Convention of
October 18, 1907: Convention (I) for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, 3
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war, which exclude lawful combatants in a conflict of a "non-international
character," acting according to the regulations of armed conflicts, from
being considered common criminals.8s
The Supplementary Treaty does not include provisions consistent
with these treaty obligations and with the customary rules of war as they
apply to this question. Thus, under the Supplementary Treaty the U.S.
could be in violation of these treaty obligations, as well as customary
rules of war."'
The exclusions unconditionally remove the enumerated acts of vio-
lence from the "political offense exception," irrespective of their nature,
intensity, the harm they produce, the motives and goals of the actor, and
the circumstances that may have compelled the actor to commit them.
The exclusions are, contrary to customary international law and certain
aspects of conventional international law that permit their inclusion, sub-
ject to certain conditions. Acts that are regulated by these sources of in-
ternational law are also protected by the Constitution, which makes inter-
national law part of the supreme law of the land. To permit a bilateral
treaty to derogate from a customary or conventional rule of international
law may be found to be constitutional, but is it wise? The question of
wisdom leads one to ask why the Supplementary Treaty did not include
any of the provisions of the regulation of armed conflicts. The answer is
the inclusion of these provisions would appear to give some legitimacy to
the Northern Irish resistance movement, which the U.K. has always re-
Martens Nouveau Recueil (3d) :360, 36 Stat. 2199, T.S. No. 536; Convention (II) respecting
the Limitation of the Employment of Force for the Recovery of Contract Debts, 3 Martens
Nouveau Recueil (3d) 414, 36 Stat. 2241, T.S. No. 537; Convention (III) relative to the
Opening of Hostilities, 3 Martens Nouveau Recueil (3d) 437, 36 Stat. 2259, T.S. No. 539;
Convention (V) respecting the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers and Persons in Case of
war on Land, 3 Martens Nouveau Recueil (3d) 504, 36 Stat. 2310, T.S. No. 540; Convention
(VI) relating to the Status of Enemy Merchant Ships at the Outbreak of Hostilities, 3 Mar-
tens Nouveau Recueil (3d) 533; Convention (VII) relating to the Conversion of Merchant
Ships into War-Ships, :3 Martens Nouveau (3d) 557; Conventions (VIII) relative to the Lay-
ing of Automatic Submarine Contact Mines, 3 Martens Nouveau Recueil (3d) 580, 36 Stat.
2332, T.S. No. 541; convention (IX) concerning Bombardment by Naval forces in Time of
War, 3 Martens Nouveau Recueil (3d) 604, 35 Stat. 2351, T.S. No. 542; Convention (X) for
the Adaptation to Maritime Warfare of the Principles of the Geneva Convention of July 6,
1907, 3 Martens Nouveau Recueil (3d) 630, 36 Stat 2371, T.S. No. 543; Convention (XI)
relative to Certain Restrictions with Regard to the Exercise of the Right of Capture in Na-
val War, 3 Martens Nouveau Recueil (3d) 663, 36 Stat. 2396, T.S. No. 544; Convention
(XIII) relative to the Creation of an International Prize Court, 3 Martens Nouveau Recueil
(3d) 688; Convention (XIII) concerning the Rights and duties of Neutral Powers in Naval
War, 3 Martens Nouveau Recueil (3d) 713, 36 Stat. 2415, T.S. No. 545; Declaration (XIV)
Prohibiting the Discharge of Projectiles and Explosive from Balloons, 3 Martens Nouveau
Recueil (3d) 745, 36 Stat. 2439, T.S. No. 546.
85. See generally H. LEVIE, THE CODE OF INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICTS, (1986).
86. See e.g., SCHINDLER & TOMAN, THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICT (2d ed. 1982); Levie,
Documents on Prisoners of War, in 60 INTERNATIONAL LAW STUDIES: U.S. NAVAL WAR COL-
LEGE (1979); Levie, Prisoners of War in International Armed Conflict, in 59 INTERNATIONAL
LAW STUDIES: U.S. NAVAL WAR COLLEGE (1977).
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jected, and which is now also rejected by the U.S. The political implica-
tion for the U.S. is that it aligns itself with the U.K., abandoning its his-
torical neutrality in the Northern Ireland conflict, and that may not be a
wise policy, especially if it means that the U.S. will take similar positions,
or refuse to do so, with respect to other countries involved.
IV. THE WISDOM OF ARTICLE I ExCLUSIONs: THE DEMISE OF JUDICIAL
DETERMINATION AND THE RISE OF AD Hoc POLITICAL JUDGMENT
The category of "international crimes" exclusions does not need to be
embodied in a bilateral extradition treaty with a given country, because
these crimes are already subject to U.S. international legal obligations
under the relevant multilateral conventions and are also part of federal
criminal law. These crimes would be excludable from the "political of-
fense exception" as "exceptions to the exception," unless the U.S. chooses
to prosecute a person accused of such a violation as an alternative to ex-
tradition. The federal judiciary, however, does not have such jurisdiction
under present law, and the U.S. is not a party to a convention, such as
the European Convention on Transfer of Proceedings in Criminal Mat-
ters 8 7 that would permit it to accept a transfer of proceedings and prose-
cute in the U.S. Interestingly, however, the Senate's ratified version of the
Supplementary Treaty provides in Article I(a) that the U.S. may choose
"... to extradite the person sought or to submit his case to the competent
authorities for decision as to prosecution . . ." This provision may be
moot or it may provide for prosecution of international crimes committed
outside the U.S. 8
Under present U.S. jurisprudence, extradition can be granted for in-
ternational crimes,89 yet these crimes are specifically included in the Sup-
plementary Treaty. There are several reasons for their inclusion: 1) In
Quinn,90 the U.S. District Court did not consider the mailing of letters
containing explosives as an "exception to the exception," although it is an
international crime.9' The government, however, failed to raise this issue.
It is this writer's suspicion that the Government's attorneys in this case
were unaware of that fact. Considering, however, that the Senate drafters
of the ratified version of the Supplementary Treaty did not place this
exclusion in the category of international crimes, it must be assumed that
the Government's experts on the subject failed to note the applicable
multilateral conventions prohibiting the unlawful use of the mails, includ-
ing the unlawful mailing of explosives. 2 2) Arguments concerning the sta-
87. Europ. T.S. No. 73 (1972). See Schutte, The European System, in 2 M.C. BAS-
SIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: PROCEDURE 319 (1986).
88. See Blakesley, supra note 53.
89. See Demjanjuk v. Meese, 784 F.2d 1114 (D.C. Cir. 1986); Artukovic v. Rison, 784
F.2d 1254 (9th cir. 1986).
90. No. C-82-6688 R.P.A. (N.D.Cal. 1983) 783 F.2d 776 (9th Cir. 1983).
91. See BASSlOUNI, EXTRADITION, supra note 10, at 78-93.
92. See supra note 61.
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tus of accused IRA members as lawful combatants in a "conflict of non-
international character" under the international regulation of armed con-
flict could be accepted by U.S. courts,9 3 thus accepting that certain acts of
violence by irregular combatants against regular combatants, and against
permissible military targets, are non-extraditable as common criminals.
Both the U.K. and the U.S. would want to avoid such an exception and
such a legitimizing label being affixed to IRA members who engage in acts
of violence, irrespective of whether or not they are in conformity with the
international regulation of armed conflicts. 4 3) The litigation of such is-
sues before U.S. courts would be lengthy and costly. 4) The U.S. might
give an impression of being a haven for persons who engage in violence in
internal political conflicts, particularly the conflict in Northern Ireland.
While there is some legitimate U.S. concern with respect to all these
considerations, a sounder approach would have been to pursue legislative
reform of U.S. extradition laws. Legislation was proposed at the time of
the Supplementary Treaty, and is still pending before Congress.95 Since
1981, however, when the first Extradition Reform Act was before the
House, the question of whether to exclude entirely the "political offense
exception" has been hotly debated. " ' Congress appears to have accepted a
qualified approach, which recognizes that under "exceptional circum-
stances" the acts of violence excluded from consideration under the "po-
litical offense exception" could still be recognized. 97 Since the Adminis-
tration opposed this qualification, it probably decided instead to pursue
the bilateral treaty approach exemplified by the Supplementary Treaty.98
The exclusion of any judicial consideration of exceptional or extraordi-
nary circumstances is, in the opinion of this writer, an unwise policy;
there are bound to be cases where judicial discretion would be warranted
and welcomed.
Many of the arguments raised with respect to the wisdom of the ex-
clusion of international crimes also apply to the second category of exclu-
sions, "ordinary crimes of violence." These crimes should not have been
singled out for exclusion from the "political offense exception" in a single
extradition treaty with a single state, contrary to customary international
law and to the law and practice of the United States since 1848.
It is ironic in this respect that the first extradition statute passed in
93. See supra notes 84-86. See also HEARINGS, supra note 9, at 170-73 (statement of
William Hannay); Id. at 873 (resolution of American Bar Association).
94. See supra notes 84-86.
95. H.R. 3347, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., 129 CONG. REC. H4102 (1983).
96. See, e.g., The Extradition Act of 1984: Hearings on H.R. 2643 Before the Sub-
comm. on Crime of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983) [herein-
after Hearings on H.R. 2643]; The Extradition Reform Act of 1981: Hearings on H.R. 5227
of the Subcomm. on Crime of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1982) [hereinafter Hearings on H.R. 5227; The Extradition Act of 1981: Hearings on S.
1639 Before the Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong. 1st Sess. (1981).
97. H.R. 3347, supra note 95, § 3194.
98. See, e.g., Hearings, supra note 9, at 11 (testimony of Abraham D. Sofaer).
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the U.S. in 184811 was in response to the Robbins case, in which the Presi-
dent had improvidently supported the Secretary of State's request that a
court order the surrender of an accused person to England.100 The 1848
statute was intended to curb executive power and to make extradition a
judicial rather than a political determination.101 In this respect, the Sup-
plementary Treaty reveals the Administration's attempt to return extra-
dition practice in the U.S. to its position before 1848. In fact, the Admin-
istration sponsored the 1981 Senate Bill (the "Extradition Reform Act"),
which sought to give the power to determine the applicability of the "po-
litical offense exception" to the Secretary of State.0 2 Opposition in Con-
gress led to a removal of that provision in favor of the traditional judicial
determination.10 3
As stated by this writer before Committees of the Senate and House
in hearings on the 1981 Extradition Reform Act, the concern that the
U.S. may become a "haven for terrorists," as advanced by Administration
proponents of the Act, is simply preposterous. 0 4 In the last thirty years,
the "political offense exception" has been raised no more than two dozen
times. ' 5 It has been granted in only three cases. 06 To attempt, by means
of a treaty with a particular state, to preclude U.S. courts from the valid
exercise of their judicial prerogatives, which have been so well exercised
over a period of 140 years, is not only unwise, but is also an unconsciona-
ble statement of lack of confidence in the judiciary. For obvious reasons,
judicial determination is always preferable to ad hoc political judgments.
V. THE NON-DISCRIMINATION AND NON-PERSECUTION PROVISION OF
ARTICLE III: THE NEW "POLITICAL EXCEPTION"
Having provided in Article I for exclusion of international crimes and
certain common crimes of violence from the meaning of the "political of-
fense exception," the Supplementary Treaty nonetheless provides in Arti-
cle III for new grounds to bar extradition. That provision allows a relator
who is accused of having committed any of the crimes enumerated in Ar-
ticle I to argue that, regardless of the commission of such crimes, he or
99. Act of August 12, 1848, ch. 167, 9 Stat. 302.
100. In re Pobbins, 27 F. Cas. 825 (No. 16,175) (D.S.C. 1799).
101. For a scholarly discussion of the impact of In re Robbins, see In re Mackin, 668
F.2d 122 (2d Cir. 1981).
102. See supra note 73.
103. See Bassiouni, Extradition Reform Legislation in the United States: 1981-1983,
17 AKRON L. REv. 495, 547-53 (1984).
104. The Extradition Act of 1981: Hearings on S. 1639 Before the Senate Comm. on
the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 20 (1981); The Extradition Reform Act of 1981: Hear-
ings Before the Subcomm. on Crime of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 2d
Sess. 98 (1982).
105. Id.
106. In re Mackin, 668 F.2d 122 (2d Cir. 1981); Matter of Doherty, 559 F. Supp. 270
(S.D.N.Y. 1984); In re McMullen, No. 3-78-1099 M.G. (N.D.Cal. May 11, 1979). See also
Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F. 2d 776 (9th Cir. 1986).
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she is really sought in order to be tried or punished on account of race,
religion, nationality or political opinion, or, if surrendered, that he or she
may be prejudiced in his or her trial or punishment for the same
reasons.'
0 7
The language of Article III parallels the political asylum provisions of
the 1980 Refugee Act, 08 which embodies the terms of the 1967 Protocol
Amending the 1951 Refugee Convention.O9 Laudable as this provision
may seem, in effect it shifts the judicial inquiry from the "political of-
fense exception" to the more difficult inquiry into either the motives of
the U.K. as a requesting state, or the internal legal and administrative
processes of trial and detention in the U.K. There is no precedent in U.S.
legal history for such determination in the extradition context. It is hard
to conceive of the legal standards that the U.S. courts will use and the
evidence that will be admissible. This approach is certainly a departure
from the traditional "rule of non-inquiry" in extradition proceedings." 0
U.K. law enforcement practices and proceedings concerning Irish re-
sisters have been fraught with questions of discrimination and persecu-
tion. These questions can now be raised at U.S. extradition proceedings
with the U.K. Article III may potentially overwhelm the intended effect
of the Article I exclusions.
Article III(b) also introduces a novelty in U.S. extradition. It allows
the Government to appeal decisions on Article III rulings." 1 There is no
general right of Government appeal on adverse rulings. Curiously, Article
III provides for such a right, but limits it to that issue.
107. For a proposal to supplement the political offense exception with the individual's
absolute right to freedom from discrimination in extradition, see C. VAN DEN WIJNGAERT,
supra note 20, at 207-18. See also Van den Wijngaert, The Political Offense Exception to
Extradition: Defining the Issues and Searching a Feasible Alternative, 1983 REVUE BELGE
DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 741-54.
108. See The 1980 Refugee Act supra note 78.
109. See the 1967 Protocol to the 1951 Refugee Convention, 820 U.N.T.S. 454.
110. BASSIOUNI, EXTRADITION, supra note 10, at 1-17. See, e.g., U.S. v. Rauscher, 199
U.S. 407 (1886); U.S. v. Rossi, 545 F.2d 814 (2d Cir. 1976); Shapiro v. Ferrandina, 478 F.2d
894 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 884 (1973); Fiocconi v. Attorney General of United
States, 462 F.2d 475 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1059 (1972); U.S. ex rel. Donnelley v.
Mulligan, 76 F.2d 511 (2d Cir. 1935); Berenguer v. Vance, 473 F. Supp. 1195 (D.D.C. 1979).
See also Note, Toward a More Principles Approach to the Principle of Specialty, 12 COR-
NELL INT'L L.J. 309 (1979); Peroff v. Hylton, 563 F. 2d 1099 (4th Cir. 1977); Gallina v. Fraser,
278 F.2d 77 (2d Cir. 1960) (indicating in dicta that rule of non-inquiry may be abandoned).
Amendments to the 1981-83 Extradition Acts contained a partial consideration of inquiry
into a request for extradition if based on discrimination or persecution grounds and a lim-
ited right to raise issues about the future treatment of a relator. See Bassiouni, supra note
103; H.R. Rep. No. 998, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984).
111. See supra note 1.
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VI. THE WISDOM OF ARTICLE III - BARRING EXTRADITION
ON DISCRIMINATION AND PERSECUTION GROUNDS:
SUBSTITUTING THE UNMANAGEABLE FOR THE MANAGEABLE
Under Article III, a relator has the opportunity to raise questions
about the motives of the extradition request and the treatment he may
expect upon his return to the U.K."2 The U.K.'s treatment of Irish pris-
oners and detainees has been the subject of unfavorable decisions by the
European Commission on Human Rights'1 3 and the European Court of
Human Rights."' The so-called "Diplock Courts" use special procedures
for accused Irish resisters that deprive them of the traditional right to
trial by jury." 5 These and similar questions may now be raised before
U.S. courts under Article III. But what standards will the U.S. courts
adopt? Nothing in extradition law and jurisprudence exists upon which
the courts can rely as precedent, and the Senate provides no guidance.
Among the questions likely to arise are the following:
1. Will such hearings turn into a trial of U.K. policies and practices in
Northern Ireland or against Irish resisters? Will it be a trial of the
Irish resistance history and movement?
2. Will the U.K.'s legal and administrative proceedings, and law en-
forcement practices, be on trial?
3. How, and to what extent, will the U.S. government, on behalf of the
U.K., defend it?
4. To what extent will the U.S. government, on behalf of the U.K., be
compelled to present what would be tantamount to exculpatory
evidence?
5. What type of evidence can the relator introduce?
6. What evidence is the relator entitled to ask for in discovery?
7. How does a relator satisfy the burden of a preponderance of the
evidence to show that he or she falls within the confines of Article III?
8. On what precedents or analogy is the court to rely? Are the prece-
dents concerning the similar provisions on political asylum in the 1980
Refugee Act applicable in these proceedings?
9. What standards shall the Court of Appeals follow?
10. How will an appellate court objectively review the factual, politi-
112. Id.
113. See Ireland v. United Kingdom, 1976 Y.B. EUR. CONY. ON HUMAN RIGHTS 512 (Eur.
Comm'n on Human Rights).
114. See Ireland v. United Kingdom, 1976 Y.B. EUR. CONy. ON HUM. RTs. 602 (Eur. Ct.
of Hum. Rts.)(inhuman treatment); Lawless v. United Kingdom, 1961 Y.B. EUR. CONV. ON
HUM. RTS.. 430 (Eur. Ct. of Hum. Rts.) (detention in violation of Art.5 of European Conven-
tion). See also O'Boyle, Torture and Emergency Powers under the European Convention
on Human Rights: Ireland v. the United Kingdom, 71 AM. J. INT'L L. 674 (1977); Moseley,
Amnesty International Denied Ulster Inquiry, Chicago Tribune, Sept. 30, 1986, §1, at 6,
col. 1. See generally Bassiouni & Derby, An Appraisal of Torture in International Law, 48
REVUE INTERNATIONAL DE DROIT PENAL 17 (1977).
115. See Ireland v. United Kingdom, 1976 Y.B. EUR. CONY. ON HUM. RTS. 512, 532-542
(Eur. Comm'n on Hum. Rts.); Hearings, supra note 9, at 327-35 (statement of Charles E.
Rice).
VOL. 15:2,3
"POLITICAL OFFENSE EXCEPTION" REVISITED
cal, and judgmental appraisals of the magistrate or trial court?
These and other issues promise to make Article III hearings the most
exciting, if not entertaining, judicial proceedings ever heard in the U.S. A
foreign government and a resistance movement will be on trial. Gone will
be the wisdom of political neutrality and judicial limitation of adjudicat-
ing foreign political conflicts. Farewell also to the "rule of non-inquiry,"
even though it merits introduction into the extradition system. In that
respect, the debates in the House and Senate on the 1981-84 Extradition
Reform Act should have been more carefully considered.""0
Is it conceivable that the U.K. will accept being subjected to such
proceedings by pressing for the extradition of such Irish resisters as Mc-
Mullen, Doherty, Mackin, and Quinn? Did the Senate, in its political wis-
dom, intend Article III to deter the U.K. from pursuing extradition in
certain thorny cases? If that is the case, it is surely an ingenious political
expedient to ratify the Supplementary Treaty, thus appearing to make all
parties concerned happy with it, while having a provision that might de-
ter the U.K. from using the Supplementary Treaty in certain cases. Fur-
thermore, it allows Irish resisters their day in court. It would indeed be
quite a day for Irish resisters to vilify the U.K. and glorify their cause in
an Article III hearing. The Senate and the Administration should have
been wise enough to leave the "political offense exception" as it stood,
rather than to create this new situation.
Paragraph (b) of Article III provides for a right of appeal for both
the government and the relator on Article III issues. Is it conceivable,
regardless of which party prevails, that the other side will not appeal?
Article III(b) is the first time in the history of U.S. extradition that the
government has a right to appeal, even though only on that narrow issue.
Such an approach is difficult to understand. The Extradition Reform Act,
in all its versions from 1981 to 1984, contained a provision on the govern-
ment's right to appeal irrespective of the issue." 7 Would that not have
been the better approach? Once again, an ad hoc solution of dubious wis-
dom has been used.
Based on all the arguments raised above, this author cannot help but
wonder whether the Senate may have ratified the Supplementary Treaty
with such revisions in order to generate momentum for the passage of the
Extradition Reform Act of 1984."1 If so, the Administration, which has
been reluctant to endorse the Act, may now find it best to support it. The
half-measures that crept into Article III and other provisions of the Sup-
plementary Treaty could then be restored to fuller legislative
consideration.
116. See H.R. 3347, § 3194(d); Hearings on H.R. 2643, 96 at 274-77 (statement of this
author); Hearings on H.R. 5227, supra note 96 at 104,105 (statement of this author).
117. H.R. 3347, § 3195. See H.R. 3347, 129 CON.. REc. H4102 (1983).
118. See H.R. 3347, 129 CON(,. REc. H4102 (1983).
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VII. APPRAISAL
The decision of the Administration to tamper with the "political of-
fense exception," can only be explained by the presumed pressures of the
U.K. government in light of its experiences and policies with Irish resist-
ers. The attempt on Prime Minister Thatcher's life at Brighton was most
likely an important factor." 9 Additionally, the three cases discussed
above were an embarrassment to the U.K. 20 That government would cer-
tainly like to put an end to the possibility that Irish resisters who commit
acts of terror-violence can find sanctuary in the U.S. Thus, the original
text of the Supplementary Treaty contained a provision on the applica-
bility of the statute of limitation of the requesting state (Article 11(h)).
The combination of this Article with Articles I and IV (retroactivity)
would have enabled the U.K. to make new requests for the extradition of
Messrs. McMullen,' 2' Doherty'22 and Mackin.123 Their extradition would
have been a significant blow to the IRA and PIRA. However, the Senate's
ratified version, and in particular Article III, makes the prompt return of
these three persons improbable. If the Administration wanted to alter the
judicial application of the "political offense exception," it should have
done so through legislation rather than through an ad hoc treaty, which
implies a special relationship with our country, but not with others. Such
a precedent opens the floodgates for the amendment or supplementation
of existing U.S. extradition treaties, which the U.S. has with more than
one hundred countries,'24 yet does not provide any consistent policy and
application for a legal process that requires both.
The Supplementary Treaty reverses a historical trend in the U.S.,
which, since the 1860's Irish rebellion against British rule in Ireland, has
never surrendered an Irish political resister to Great Britain. Such a re-
versal, under the terms established in the Supplementary Treaty, means
only that the U.S. has taken sides in an internal political conflict, which it
had carefully avoided doing in the past. A policy of neutrality toward for-
eign internal civil strife is wisest in light of the many ongoing civil con-
flicts occurring all over the world. The U.S. has thus placed itself in a
difficult position with respect to other countries seeking similar favored
treatment. In order to avoid embroiling itself in all sorts of difficult situa-
tions with a large number of countries, and becoming, indirectly, a party
to foreign internal civil strife, the U.S. should have continued its histori-
cal neutrality.
The Administration has thus opened a Pandora's box. Other coun-
119. See, The Target: Thatcher, Time, Oct. 22, 1984, at 50. See also infra note 127.
120. In re Mackin, 668 F.2d 122 (2d Cir. 1981); Matter of Doherty, 599 F. Supp. 270
(S.D.N.Y. 1984); In re McMullen, No. 3-78-1099 M.G. (N.D. Cal. May 11, 1979).
121. In re McMullen, No. 3-78-1899 M.F. (N.D. Cal. May 11, 1979).
122. Matter of Doherty, 599 F. Supp. 270 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
123. In re Mackin, 688 F.2d 122 (2d Cir. 1981).
124. See I. KAVASS & A. SPRUDZS, supra note 74.
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tries are now likely to seek the favored treatment afforded the U.K. The
Administration will have to make hard judgments in granting or denying
requests by other states that desire similar extradition provisions. Denial
of the requests of some states will surely have a negative effect on U.S.
relations with those countries. Acceptance of such requests may require
the U.S. to review periodically the internal conditions in particular coun-
tries in order to determine whether such favored treatment should con-
tinue, thus altering its extradition treaties with the changing internal po-
litical circumstances of these countries as they are perceived in the U.S.
Considering the change in U.S. perceptions of foreign regimes (e.g.
apartheid in South Africa, the former Marcos regime in the Philippines,
Pinochet's regime in Chile, and others), this would require a constant
process of evaluation. 2 ' The Senate would be faced with ratification of
many new supplementary extradition treaties and the abrogation of older
ones, which would unnecessarily occupy its time and energy. Moreover,
the U.S. would signal internal insurgents in countries given such favored
treatment that it is opposed to them. The U.S. could then become a tar-
get of their acts of terror-violence. In addition, if one of these groups
should become the new ruling regime in any of these countries, the U.S.
would have unnecessarily created enmity with that new regime. The Sen-
ate has already stumbled into this pitfall by stating in its ratification
"Declaration:"
The Senate of the United States declares it will not give its advice
and consent to any treaty that would narrow the political offense ex-
ception with a totalitarian or other non-democratic regime and that
nothing in the Supplementary Treaty with the United Kingdom shall
be considered a precedent by the executive branch or the Senate for
other treaties.
26
Mutatis mutandi, a non-totalitarian or democratic regime, however these
terms are to be defined or perceived, may rely on the Supplementary
Treaty as a valid precedent.
The U.K. exerted much effort to obtain the ratification of the Sup-
125. The Administration and the Senate should be reminded of the draft United States
- Philippines Treaty on Extradition, which was concluded with the government of Ferdi-
nand Marcos. Under that Treaty, the Marcos regime could have sought the extradition of
the late Benigno Aquino. At the hearings before the Senate on that Treaty, the Administra-
tion and members of the Senate supporting it raised similar arguments to those raised re-
garding the political offense exception in the context of the Supplementary Treaty. Fortu-
nately, the Senate did not ratify the draft United States - Philippines treaty. Subsequent
events in the Philippines proved the wisdom of not rushing into ad hoc bilateral treaties.
See Hearings, supra note 9, at 119-21 (statement of Christopher Pyle).
126. 132 CONG. REc. S9120 (daily ed. July 16, 1986); S. ExEc. REP. 17, supra note 18, at
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plementary Treaty 2 ' which may benefit that country. The U.S., however,
needs both comprehensive reform of legislation and a consistent policy.' 28
127. See Kennedy, Why were F-Ills 'Misused' in the Raid on Libya? Chicago Tribune,
Aug. 19, 1986, §1, at 15, col. 2. The author, who was an Air Force intelligence officer and a
strategic analyst with the U.S. Army War College, is of the opinion that the issue was the
political agenda of both President Reagan and Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher that
made dramatic British support for some aspect of American policy highly desirable. That
matter was an extradition treaty aimed at members of the Irish Republican Army seeking
sanctuary in the United States. The treaty had been blocked in the Senate Foreign Affairs
Committee for nearly a year, despite Reagan's endorsement. (Committee members who op-
posed it thought the United States was being pressured to violate a long tradition of support
for opponents of tyranny and oppression.) "Thatcher, of course, has a particular enmity
toward the IRA; it has tried to kill her once and has vowed to try again."
128. See Hearings, supra note 9, at 73 (statement of William J. Hughes); Id. at 136,37
(statement of this author). See also Bassiouni, supra note 103.
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